

Electricity market reform: What is (not) in the European Commission proposal

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Overview

- Not the issue
 - Electricity short-term market pricing mechanism
- Issues that emerged during crisis
 - (energy) poverty and inflation
 - insufficient hedging by consumers and retailers
 - difficulties in accessing cheap renewables by consumers
 - investment uncertainty, which increased with the many emergency interventions during the crisis.

The image shows the cover of a policy brief document. At the top left is the EUI Florence School of Regulation logo, and at the top right is the Robert Schuman Centre logo. The title 'POLICY BRIEF' is prominently displayed in blue. Below it, the main title 'Electricity market reform: what is (not) in the European Commission proposal' is written in black. The document includes a 'Highlights' section with five bullet points discussing the energy crisis, the proposal's merits, recommendations for improvement, risks for negotiations, and the need for a bigger reform. The author is identified as Leonardo Meeus, EUI. The issue date is 2023/07, and the month is May 2023. On the right side of the cover, there is a decorative pattern of yellow arches.

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POLICY BRIEF

Electricity market reform: what is (not) in the European Commission proposal

Highlights



- In 2022, we experienced an unprecedented energy crisis. Governments intervened to help consumers pay their bills and to apply revenue claw-back mechanisms on utilities. The European Commission has also been tasked to draft a market reform proposal in record time.
- Two main reasons why we like the proposal: it preserves the pricing mechanism of the short-term electricity markets; it complements the existing electricity markets with regulatory measures to address the main concerns that emerged during the crisis.
- Recommendation to improve the proposal: it could include the development of detailed guidelines for the implementation of two-way CfDs. Developers that sign such a contract should still be exposed to the incentives of short-term wholesale and balancing prices.
- Risk for the trilogue negotiations: The proposal does not foresee that Member States can continue with revenue claw back mechanisms and/or (regulated) long term contracts for existing assets. Some Member States might want to add that option to the proposal. Undermining investor confidence in this way would be unfortunate because we have to speedup investments to comply with the Fit-for-55 Package.
- Need for a bigger reform (with impact assessment during the next Commission mandate): If we modernize and Europeanize capacity mechanisms, they can guide the investments we need in backup solutions for a renewable-based system, which includes demand response and storage.

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Conclusion

- Two main reasons why we like the proposal
 - The proposal preserves the pricing mechanism of the short-term electricity markets
 - The proposal complements the existing electricity markets with regulatory measures to address the main concerns that emerged during the crisis
- Recommendation to improve the proposal
 - Detailed guidelines for the implementation of two-way CfDs
- Risk for the trilogue negotiations
 - Some Member States might want to add revenue claw-back mechanisms to the proposal, it would be unfortunate to undermine investor confidence
- Need for a bigger reform
 - If we modernize and Europeanize capacity mechanisms, they can guide the investments we need in backup solutions for a renewable-based system



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